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I. Introduction
That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute threepence
only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force
him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?'
So wrote James Madison in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, in opposition to a tax used to pay Christian teachers.2
The Supreme Court has looked to the works of both Madison and Thomas
Jefferson for guidance on interpreting the Establishment Clause. 3 Relying on
those works, the Court wrote that "[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state.... [That] must be kept high and impregnable. ',4 So
it is surprising that in the same case in which it articulated a policy of strict
separation, the Court found that a state could reimburse parents of parochial
school students for the cost of transportation.5
Throughout the past half-century, changes in thought about separation of
church and state have evolved via debate regarding religion and state-funded
6education. During that time, the Supreme Court heard numerous
Establishment Clause challenges to government programs allowing recipients
to direct educational materials or aid to religious schools.7 Believing that the
1. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, app. 65-66 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
2. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947) (discussing Madison's
opposition to the proposed law).
3. See id. at 13 (addressing the roles that Madison and Jefferson had in crafting the First
Amendment).
4. Id. at 18.
5. See id. (stating that the challenged program did not violate the First Amendment).
6. See Klint Alexander, The Road to Vouchers: The Supreme Court's Compliance and
the Crumbling of the Wall of Separation Between Church and State in American Education, 92
KY. L.J. 439, 447 (2004) (discussing the development of the "modem era of Establishment
Clause doctrine" and its focus on public education).
7. See id. at 447-61 (discussing the history of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in the area of education).
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Establishment Clause no longer poses a serious obstacle to state aid to religious
schools, 8 some proponents of school choice programs argue that excluding
religious schools from government aid programs violates the Free Exercise
Clause.9 Proponents also argue that some state provisions requiring the
exclusion of religious schools from government aid programs are tainted with
anti-Catholic animus and may violate the First Amendment. 10
Recent Free Exercise decisions, which emphasized the idea of neutrality
towards religion," supported the argument that state restrictions on sectarian
educational funding violate the Free Exercise Clause. 12  School choice
proponents hoped the Supreme Court would extend the neutrality principle into
the school funding context and disallow programs that excluded religious
schools.' 3 The Supreme Court, however, delivered a serious blow to their
arguments in Locke v. Davey.14 The decision addressed the application of the
Free Exercise Clause to a postsecondary scholarship program15 and may
foreshadow how the Court would decide a Free Exercise challenge to a school
aid program that excludes religious schools.'
6
Although the implications of Locke for the school aid debate are not
obvious, 17 the Court's decision indicates that it will allow the states room
within the Religion Clauses to structure school aid programs.1 8 The Court,
8. See infra Part II.B (discussing Establishment Clause cases).
9. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 170-71 (2003) (arguing that denying benefits such as school
vouchers to those who engage in religious activities might violate the Free Exercise Clause).
10. See, e.g., Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: The Revival
of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry By Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L.
413,414 (2003) (arguing that state constitutional provisions known as "Blaine amendments"
were adopted as a result of anti-Catholic animus and that some interpretations of these
amendments violate the First Amendment).
11. See infra Part II.C (discussing recent Free Exercise cases).
12. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Hitting the Wall, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at
68 (noting that recent decisions requiring neutral treatment of religion in the provision of
benefits supported such an argument).
13. See id. (stating that those who hoped the Court would invalidate all such state
restrictions rested their hope on an extension of the neutrality principle).
14. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Locke decision).
15. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715-17 (2004) (describing the Promise
Scholarship Program at issue).
16. See Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge ofAllegiance,
and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARv. L. REV. 155,
187 (2004) (noting that "decisions applying [Locke] have extended it to elementary and
secondary education").
17. See infra Part III.B (discussing Locke's impact on school aid challenges).
18. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 719 (discussing the "play in the joints" between the two
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without addressing the neutrality principle, concluded that the Promise
Scholarship Program made a distinction that the federal Constitution allows.' 9
Thus, the decision indicates that the Free Exercise Clause does not require
absolutely neutral funding of similar religious and secular pursuits. The state of
Washington could constitutionally condition a scholarship on the recipient's
willingness to forgo a degree in devotional theology.20 The decision's
reasoning will allow the Court to reject an unconstitutional condition analysis
for state school funding programs that devote all of their resources to secular
schools. 21 Thus, the exclusion of religious schools from school aid programs
does not by itself violate the Free Exercise Clause.22
This Note both applies the Court's reasoning in Locke in the school aid
context and addresses whether Locke's analysis is appropriate. Part II provides
background material on the school voucher debate, recent Establishment Clause
cases involving government aid to religious schools, and Free Exercise
jurisprudence.23 Part HI analyzes the Locke decision and concludes that, after
Locke, the Court is unlikely to invalidate a school aid program that excludes
religious schools.24 Part V addresses the appropriateness of extending Locke's
analysis to school aid cases and concludes that extending the analysis is
appropriate.25 As will be discussed, the neutrality principle does not work in
the school funding context because it is impossible to arrive at a demonstrably
neutral solution to the funding debate and neutrality would not serve the
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause.26 Thus, Locke's analysis, rather than
neutrality, is an appropriate governing principle. 27 Part V concludes that the
Religion Clauses, which recognizes that some state actions are permitted by the Establishment
Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause).
19. See id. at 721 (stating that devotional theology degrees are fungible from other
degrees and that treating them differently did not indicate "hostility toward religion").
20. See id. at 725 (upholding the Promise Scholarship Program).
21. See infra Part IV (discussing the Court's invocation of conditional funding language
in Locke and important conditional funding cases).
22. See infra Part V.D (arguing that, absent indications of animus, the Free Exercise
Clause allows a state to exclude sectarian schools from school aid programs).
23. See infra Part II (discussing the school voucher debate, Establishment Clause cases,
and Free Exercise Clause cases).
24. See infra Part III.B (discussing the potential outcome of a school aid case after Locke).
25. See infra Part V (discussing why Locke's reasoning applies in the school aid context).
26. See infra Part V.C (addressing the problems with a neutrality approach to Free
Exercise challenges to aid programs).
27. See infra notes 296-98 and accompanying text (arguing that Locke's reasoning should
be extended to school aid challenges).
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goals of the Free Exercise Clause are better served by condemnation of only
those funding programs that exhibit animus towards religion.
28
II. Background on the Constitutional Issues Surrounding School
Voucher Cases
A. The School Voucher Debate
Historically, public education and religion were not strictly separate.29
Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, public
education was infused with Protestant values. 30 Although schools tried to avoid
sectarianism by catering to the common practices of all the Protestant sects,
public education included Bible reading, prayer, and other religious
observance. 31  By the early twentieth century, however, the Protestant
stronghold in America was significantly weakened.32 This development, and
the emerging secularism of the American public, led to a "post-Protestant
America... [which felt] antipathy for aid to religious schools."
' 33
During the middle of the twentieth century, numerous Protestant groups
emerged in opposition to government funding of sectarian schools and
advocated a policy of strict separation of government and religion.34 The
Supreme Court also adopted this position. In 1947, a majority of the Court
agreed that
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.... In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between church and State.
35
28. See infra Part V.D (discussing why the Court should be concerned with animus
towards religion in school funding cases).
29. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 297 (2001) ("For most of its history, public education in
America had been... unmistakably Protestant.").
30. See id. at 297-99 (discussing the Protestant influence on public education).
31. See id. at 297-98 (discussing Protestant practices in religious schools).
32. See id. at 306 (stating that "the identification of America as a specifically Protestant
nation was becoming harder and harder to maintain").
33. Id. at 312.
34. See id. at 313-14 (discussing Protestant groups that opposed public funding for
sectarian schools).
35. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
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The dissent disagreed with the outcome of the case but agreed with the strict
separation principles reflected in the quoted language.36
Despite this strong language, the Court has not consistently taken a strict
separation approach to school aid cases.3 7 In fact, the Court has approved aid to
religious schools in numerous forms, including payment for a sign-language
interpreter used at a Catholic school 38 and tax deductions for parents of
parochial school students for expenses relating to tuition, textbooks, and
transportation. 39 More recently, the Court has moved towards broadly allowing
public funds to be used at religious schools, approving neutral aid programs
that include religious schools as long as private choice by recipients breaks the
connection between the government and funding of religious education.4 °
Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of government aid to
religious schools have had a major impact on the "school choice" debate.4'
School choice is "the idea that parents should have a great deal more say than
they have traditionally [had] over where their children attend school., 42 School
voucher programs are school choice schemes that would make public tax
money available for use towards private schools.43 Some voucher programs,
like the one in place in the Milwaukee Public School District, include private
sectarian schools. 44  Cleveland offers a similar voucher program. 45  The
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
36. See id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the constitutional freedom from
government support of religion "was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its rigidity");
id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose of the Establishment Clause "was
to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion").
37. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 164 (stating that "the no-aid principle never
completely triumphed").
38. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993) (holding that the
Establishment Clause does not bar a state from providing a deaf student who attends a religious
school with an interpreter).
39. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983) (holding that the Establishment
Clause permitted Minnesota to grant a tax deduction to parents for parochial school expenses).
40. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence).
41. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (discussing potential constitutional
challenges to school aid programs that exclude religious schools).
42. Harry Brighouse, School Vouchers, Separation of Church and State, and Personal
Autonomy, in NOMOS XLIII: MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 244,244 (Stephen Macedo &
Yael Tamir eds., 2002).
43. See id. (describing school voucher plans).
44. See id. at 244-45 (discussing the Milwaukee Private Choice Program).
45. See id. at 246 (noting that the Cleveland Scholarship and Training Program includes
religious schools).
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Cleveland program was challenged by taxpayers on the ground that it violated
the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.46 The Supreme
Court rejected the argument.
47
In thewake of the decision regarding the Cleveland program, the issue is
now whether school voucher programs that provide funding for private school
tuition are constitutionally required to include religious schools in their
benefits.48 School voucher advocates are planning to use various constitutional
arguments to challenge state bans on funding for religious schools. 49 They
argue that "if [state constitutions] go too far in protecting against the
establishment of religion... they violate both the free exercise and free speech
clauses of the First Amendment."5" Though the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the constitutionality of excluding religious schools from voucher
programs, 5' it has addressed a similar issue in the context of higher education in
a case involving the exclusion of devotional theology degrees from a
scholarship program.52 The case, which is discussed in Part III, sheds some
light on how the Court would approach a school voucher case and indicates that
the Court is likely to uphold a school aid program that excludes religious
schools.53
B. Establishment Clause Background
A brief introduction illustrates the Court's changing treatment of state aid
programs as dictated by its evolving interpretation of the Establishment
46. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 639 (2002) (addressing an
Establishment Clause challenge to the Cleveland school choice program).
47. See id. at 663 (holding that the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program did not violate
the Establishment Clause); infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing Zelman).
48. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 173 (discussing a possible discrimination claim when a
state funds private, secular education but not private, religious education).
49. See Tony Mauro, Voucher Issue Likely to Return to High Court, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5,
2002, at A6 (describing school voucher advocates' planned attacks on state provisions banning
funding for religious schools).
50. Id.
51. See Berg, supra note 9, at 161 (stating that "the next constitutional question [is]:
whether a state's exclusion of religious schools from a voucher program... [is] a form of anti-
religious discrimination").
52. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,715 (2004) (addressing a Free Exercise challenge
to a university scholarship program that did not permit the scholarship to be put towards
devotional theology degrees).
53. See infra Part III (discussing the case and how it affects the chances of a successful
challenge to a voucher program that excludes religious schools).
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Clause.54 This subpart is not meant to present a complete history of the
Establishment Clause-that task lies beyond the scope of this Note.55 A few
basic points established here are necessary to understand this Note's analysis of
the Locke decision.56 Because this Note focuses on Free Exercise challenges to
school aid programs, most of the cases that are discussed involve such
programs.
The Supreme Court's approach to the Establishment Clause57 has been in
flux since 1947.58 That year, the Court decided the first case of "the modem
era of Establishment Clause doctrine. 59 In Everson v. Board of Education,
60
54. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 29, at 290 (stating that "change is underway" and that
the Court's "no-aid policy is faltering").
55. See generally Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673 (2002) (discussing the modem Establishment
Clause); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1986) (looking at historical evidence relating to the
Establishment Clause to determine the Framers' intent and rejecting the view that the Framers
did not intend to allow nonpreferential aid to religion); Steve Gey, Note, Rebuilding the Wall:
The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 1463 (1981) (engaging in a critical analysis of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and suggesting a strict neutrality approach).
56. See infra Part III.B (analyzing Locke).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 29, at 283 (exploring the development of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence from a political perspective and stating that "the Court and
the nation [are] in the midst of a sea-change that ultimately will contradict past practice as
clearly and fully as Brown rejected Plessy"); see generally Alexander, supra note 6, at 447-62
(tracing the Supreme Court's increasing acceptance of state aid to sectarian schools through the
development of a neutrality standard).
59. Alexander, supra note 6, at 447; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 n.4
(2000) (plurality opinion) (discussing the application of the Establishment Clause to
government aid programs benefiting religious schools and stating that "[c]ases prior to Everson
discussed the issue only indirectly").
60. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). A New Jersey taxpayer had challenged,
under both the New Jersey and United States Constitutions, a state statute that allowed a local
school board to reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to parochial schools.
Id. at 3-4. The Supreme Court initially rejected a due process claim that the tax was being used
for a private purpose. Id. at 5-7. The opinion primarily addressed the argument that the
payments constituted state support of religion in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 7-8.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions reviewed the history surrounding the adoption of the
First Amendment. Id. at 11-13; id. at 31-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Despite having found
that the First Amendment "erected a wall between church and state," the Court held that the
New Jersey statute did not cause an establishment of religion. Id. at 18. The majority reasoned
that the statute established a neutral, general aid program that protected the welfare of children
and was made available regardless of recipients' religious beliefs, and that cutting off religious
organizations or practitioners from general welfare law is "obviously not the purpose of the First
Amendment." Id. at 16-18. The Court held that the New Jersey law was valid. Id. at 18. The
dissent agreed that "the [First] Amendment forbids any appropriation, large or small, from
1278
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the Court strictly applied the principle of separation of church and state to a
taxpayer's challenge of a government aid program.61 The Court cited to James
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments62 and
declared that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can.., pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
' 63
The Everson Court established the interpretation used in school aid cases
until the late 1960s when the Court developed the Lemon test.64 The Lemon
test requires that a law: (1) "have a secular legislative purpose; '65 (2) have a
"principal or primary effect.., that neither advances nor inhibits religion; "66
and (3) "not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."',
67
The test represented a movement away from the Court's strict application of
separation of church and state principles and towards an approach that focused
on the likelihood that aid would be diverted towards a religious use.
68
From about 1968 through the early 1980s, the Court used the Lemon test
to analyze the constitutionality of school aid programs. 69 Although the Court
continued to apply the Lemon test, it has adopted a neutrality standard to ensure
that "any aid going to a religious recipient only has the effect of furthering...
[a] secular purpose. 70  Neutral aid is "aid that is offered to a broad range of
groups or persons without regard to their religion."71  Justice O'Connor
public funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises." Id. at 41 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). It disagreed with the majority's general welfare argument, characterizing it as a
"fallacy." Id. at 52 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that declaring that the funds
served a public purpose did not remove the ban on aid to religious organizations and found that
the statute at issue clearly provided such aid. Id. at 44, 52 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 18 ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.");
Alexander, supra note 6, at 448 (describing the case as preserving strict separation of church
and state); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 29, at 285 (stating that in Everson both the majority and
dissent found the Establishment Clause to stand for strict separation of church and state).
62. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11 (noting that Madison argued that "no person.., should
be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind").
63. Id. at 15.
64. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 449-53 (discussing the development of the Lemon test
and its role in eroding the "no aid to religion" rule).
65. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 613 (citation omitted).
68. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 449-53 (discussing cases that addressed the
"divertibility" issue in the context of elementary and secondary school aid programs).
69. See id. at 448-54 (describing the Court's approach to school aid cases from 1968
through the 1980s).
70. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,807-10 (2000) (plurality opinion) (applying the
Lemon test and using neutrality to satisfy the effects prong).
71. Id. at 809.
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recognized that the Court's "treatment of neutrality... [has come] close to
assigning that factor singular importance in the future adjudication of
Establishment Clause challenges to government school aid programs. ''7 2 The
Court also has emphasized that "private choice"-that is, allowing recipients to
decide where to use program funds-helps to ensure satisfaction of Lemon's
effects prong.73
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,74 the Court embraced the principle that
state aid programs may provide aid to religious schools as long as private
individuals have a "genuine and independent private choice" to direct such aid
to religious or nonreligious schools as they see fit.75 This case stated the formal
principles by which school aid programs will be judged: true private choice
and neutrality. 76 Offering a simpler approach to an area that previously had
been doctrinally complex, Zelman established that a state could include
sectarian schools in aid programs if it adhered to these principles.77 This result
72. Id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. See id. at 811 (stating that "neutrality and private choices together eliminated any
possible attribution to the government").
74. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Zelman involved a taxpayer
challenge to Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program. Id. at 648. The program provided
tuition assistance for eligible students to attend a participating public or private school. Id. at
644-45. The choice of school was left to the student's parents. Id. at 645. The program also
paid for tutors for those students who chose to remain in public school. Id. The taxpayers
claimed that the program violated the Establishment Clause by creating the perception of
government endorsement of religion. Id. at 654. The taxpayers also argued that, even if the
program does not create a perception of government endorsement of religion, Ohio's program
did not offer a genuine choice between religious and secular private schools. Id. at 658. The
challengers cited the fact that 96% of the voucher recipients attended religious schools. Id. The
Court rejected the first argument by noting that a reasonable person would not think that a
program that allowed funds to reach religious schools as a result of genuine private choice bears
"the imprimatur of government endorsement." Id. at 655. The Court rejected the second
argument by considering the full range of options available to voucher recipients in determining
whether the program offered parents a genuine choice. Id. at 655-56. The Court found that the
program did provide genuine private choice by considering, in addition to the schools
participating in the voucher program, the number of students enrolled in alternative community
schools, alternative magnet schools, and public schools with tutorial assistance. Id. at 659.
75. Id. at 652-53 (upholding the Cleveland program because it was a program of "true
private choice" and emphasizing the program's neutrality towards religion).
76. See Berg, supra note 9, at 156-57 (stating that the basic idea of Zelman is that
neutrality and true private choice break the link between advancement of religion and the
government); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad
Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REv. 489, 515 (2004) (stating
that, under Zelman, "neutrality is assigned singular importance").
77. See Berg, supra note 9, at 162 ("Zelman's analysis suggests that it will be relatively
easy for a voucher program that includes religious schools to satisfy the Establishment
Clause.").
1280
TAKING IT OUT OF NEUTRAL
raised the following question: If states can provide aid to religious schools
by adhering to the principles of Zelman, can states constitutionally deny aid
to these schools?
78
The Zelman decision sparked a wave of litigation challenging the
exclusion of religious elementary and secondary schools from aid programs.79
Many states' constitutions include provisions that bar religious schools from
participating in aid programs.8° The strong language of Zelman and other
Supreme Court cases has implied that states have little, if any, Establishment
Clause related interest in excluding religious schools from state aid
81programs. State provisions requiring the exclusion of religious schools are
defended as protecting antiestablishment interests.82 However, the principles
of neutrality and true private choice may have invalidated this defense.
83
School voucher advocates are prepared to challenge school voucher programs
that exclude religious schools by questioning the validity of "Blaine
amendments," which they claim were passed under a cloud of anti-Catholic
animus. 84 Some proponents have argued more generally that states must
78. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,829 (2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding
a law providing educational materials and equipment to public and private schools, including
religious schools, and stating that "nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of
pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of
this Court bar it"); Berg, supra note 9, at 173 (arguing that withholding benefits from a person
who would use it at a religious school is a penalty on religious exercise and, therefore, violates
the Free Exercise Clause).
79. See, e.g., Mauro, supra note 49 (discussing voucher advocates' plans to challenge
state constitutional provisions that prohibit government aid to religious schools); see also
Colleen Carlton Smith, Note, Zelman's Evolving Legacy: Selective Funding ofSecularPrivate
Schools in State School Choice Programs, 89 VA. L. REv. 1953, 1956-67 (2003) (discussing
post-Zelman challenges to school voucher and tuition programs).
80. See Berg, supra note 9, at 167-68 (discussing various types of state bans on aid to
religious schools).
81. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 478 (questioning whether the Establishment Clause is
relevant in judging the constitutionality of aid programs).
82. See, e.g., Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748,760 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding a recipient's
Free Exercise challenge to the Washington Promise Scholarship Program), rev'd, 540 U.S. 712
(2004). Washington defended the program based on its interest in "not appropriating or
applying money to religious instruction." Id. at 759.
83. See id. at 760 (emphasizing that under the Promise Scholarship Program money goes
to religious institutions only as a result of private choice, highlighting Zelman's focus on
neutrality and true private choice, and finding that no reasonable person could find that the state
was supporting a religious establishment).
84. See Mauro, supra note 49 (discussing state Blaine amendments and school voucher
advocates' plans to challenge them).
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allow recipients to use vouchers at religious schools if they are available for
use at private schools.85
The Blaine Amendment was proposed by Congressman James G. Blaine
in 1875 and was intended to prevent all government funding.of sectarian
schools.86 Although the Senate did not pass the Amendment, many states
adopted their own version of the Blaine Amendment.87 In fact, many states
were forced to adopt such constitutional provisions as a prerequisite to
admission into the Union. 88 These amendments are claimed to be tainted
with anti-Catholic animus because they were intended to prevent Catholics
from securing public funding for Catholic schools.89
School voucher advocates claim that the state "Blaine amendments" are
unconstitutional under the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses. 90
They argue that these provisions are invalid because they fail the neutrality
requirement and because they inhibit religious beliefs and practices. 9' They
also argue that the provisions should be subject to strict scrutiny because they
disfavor religion, a suspect classification.92 This analysis would require a
state to come up with a compelling interest for the resulting discrimination,
something voucher proponents believe states cannot do.93 This Note,
however, does not explore the validity of these claims. The issue is important
because the invalidity of a state "Blaine amendment" could result in the
invalidation of state aid programs excluding religious schools, even if these
programs otherwise are valid under the Free Exercise Clause.
85. See Berg, supra note 9, at 152 (arguing that "[i]f a state makes vouchers available for
use at private schools, it must authorize their use at religious schools as well").
86. See Luke A. Lantta, The Post-Zelman Voucher Battleground: Where to Turn After
Federal Challenges to Blaine Amendments Fail, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at
213, 215-16 (describing the Amendment as exploiting public concerns over government
funding of sectarian schools and religious practices in the public system).
87. See Gall, supra note 10, at 423 (discussing adoption of Blaine amendments and like
provisions by the states).
88. See id. at 423 (discussing adoption of Blaine amendments and like provisions by the
states).
89. See id. at 420-24 (discussing the anti-Catholic animus that spurred the federal and
state Blaine amendments).
90. See, e.g., Lantta, supra note 86, at 221-22 (discussing potential federal constitutional
challenges to state Blaine amendments).
91. See, e.g., id. (discussing potential First Amendment challenges to state Blaine
amendments).
92. See, e.g., id. at 222 (discussing proposed Equal Protection challenges to state Blaine
amendments).
93. See id. (stating that some voucher advocates do not believe that states could produce
compelling reasons for excluding religious schools).
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C. Recent Free Exercise Jurisprudence
An introduction to the Free Exercise Clause is helpful because this Note
references the ideals of neutrality and general applicability, as used by the
Court in Free Exercise cases. The main point one should take from this
discussion is that, at least before Locke, commentators largely agreed that these
ideals separated those laws that would generally survive Free Exercise scrutiny
from those that would be subject to a compelling interest test.94 Because this
Note focuses on the likely outcome of a Free Exercise challenge to a state aid
program that excludes religious schools,95 it cites to the Court's current
doctrinal framework.
The Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence has moved towards a focus on
facial neutrality towards religion.96 Clearly, a law is not neutral if its purpose is
to inhibit or deter religious activity.9 7 In Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smithy, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does
94. See David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First Amendment, 26 Sw. U. L.
REV. 201,212 (1997) ("Where the Court finds a law to be both neutral and generally applicable,
it will not apply strict scrutiny to the law's impact on religious exercise."); Richard F. Duncan,
Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability
Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 864 (2001) (stating that a law that is neutral and
generally applicable will generally be upheld and a law that fails to meet either ideal will have to
survive strict scrutiny).
95. See infra Parts III& IV (discussing the possible outcome of a Free Exercise challenge
to a school aid program that does not allow religious schools to participate).
96. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12 (noting that the neutrality principle has recently
controlled cases involving challenges under the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause,
and the Free Exercise Clause).
97. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (describing how the Court determines whether a law is neutral towards religion).
98. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith,
Smith and Black were fired by a private employer for using a hallucinogen as part of a ceremony
at their Native American Church, and Oregon subsequently denied them unemployment
compensation. Id. at 874. Smith and Black argued that the Free Exercise Clause protected them
from having to follow any generally applicable law when observance of the law would require
(or forbid) acts their religion forbids (or requires). Id. at 878. The Court distinguished other
cases denying the applicability of general laws to religious objectors because each case
involved, in addition to a Free Exercise issue, a second constitutional right that was being
infringed upon. Id. at 881-82. Finding that the law did not regulate religious beliefs but instead
regulated conduct in general, the Court refused to exempt respondents from the application of
the law because of their religious convictions. Id. at 882. The respondents also argued that
their claim should be evaluated under the balancing test established in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963). Id. at 883. Under this test, "governmental actions that substantially burden a
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest." Id. The Court
distinguished those cases where it applied the Sherbert test, noting that they involved individual
assessments performed by the government; in such cases, the government may not deny
individualized assessments to individuals facing "religious hardship" without compelling
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not excuse an individual from compliance with "a valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." 99 Thus, as long as a law is
neutral with respect to religion and generally applicable, the government does
not need to show a compelling interest justifying the law's effect on religion. 00
Justice O'Connor has recognized the weight that the Court gave to the
neutrality of the prohibitory law at issue and has argued that "[t]here is nothing
talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability or general criminal
prohibitions, for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his
religious conscience.f
10'
At the same time, a law that is not neutral with respect to religion or a law
that burdens religion and is not generally applicable might require a compelling
government interest, and if so, it will have to be narrowly tailored to that
interest. 102 The Supreme Court case that established this proposition, Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,'13 involved the Church's
justification. Id. at 884 (citations omitted). The Court declined to extend the test to situations
involving generally applicable laws. Id. at 884-85. Therefore, the Court found that Oregon
may deny respondents unemployment compensation if their dismissal was based on violation of
the peyote law. Id. at 890.
99. Id. at 879 (quotationsomitted).
100. See id. at 883-85 (rejecting petitioners' claim that the government cannot force an
individual to obey a generally applicable law that offends his religious beliefs unless the
government shows a compelling interest in enforcing the law).
101. Id. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531-32
(1993) (stating the compelling government interest test should be applied to laws that are not
neutral or generally applicable).
103. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). In
response to the petitioner Church's attempt to establish a church of the Santeria faith in Hialeah,
the city council adopted three ordinances intended to prevent the ritual sacrifice of animals
within the city. Id. at 527-28. The ordinances prohibited the killing, slaughtering, or sacrifice
of animals in any type of ritual. Id. at 527. The ordinances exempted slaughtering by "'licensed
establishmeni[s]' of animals 'specifically raised for food purposes."' Id. at 527-28. They also
permitted slaughter in areas zoned for slaughterhouses and for the sale of small quantities of
hogs or cattle. Id. at 528. According to the Court, a law that fails to satisfy either the neutrality
or general applicability requirement.of Smith must be supported by a compelling government
interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 531-32. The Court began its
analysis by looking at the neutrality of the ordinances. Id. at 533. It found that, although a law
that is not facially neutral always lacks a permissible objective, a facially neutral law also might
impermissibly target religion. Id. at 533-34. The Court concluded that the purpose of the
ordinances was to suppress the Santeria religion. Id. at 534. The Court then looked to the
government's justifications for the ordinances and found that, while its interests in public health
and preventing cruel treatment of animals were legitimate, these goals could have been pursued
in ways that did not so fully inhibit the practice of Santeria. Id. at 538. The Court considered
the general applicability requirement to determine whether the ordinances selectively burdened
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Free Exercise challenge to laws that the city had passed with the purpose of
prohibiting the Church from practicing Santeria within Hialeah.104 The Court
indicated that a law that is not facially neutral with respect to religion will be
subject to strict scrutiny to ensure that it does not violate the right to free
exercise;' °5 the Court also stated that, even if a law is facially neutral, "[o]fficial
action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded
by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.', 10 6 The Court
was not clear, however, as to whether the compelling interest test will be
applied absent an "object ... to infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation." 10 7 The federal circuits have split on whether
Lukumi requires an object to infringe upon religious practice before a law must
be supported by a compelling government interest, and the Supreme Court has
not addressed this split.1
0 8
Together, Smith and Lukumi illustrate the Court's current approach to Free
Exercise challenges. Generally, the government may infringe on a protected
activity through a general, nontargeted law; the government may not, however,
infringe on protected activities through laws that are nonneutral, laws that are
not generally applicable, or laws with a direct purpose and effect of inhibiting
the protected activity.'0 9 The latter group of laws may be required to meet a
compelling interest test. 110 In the Free Exercise context, however some courts
only religiously motivated behaviors. Id. at 543-44. The Court found that these ordinances
clearly failed the general applicability prong because they were underinclusive as to protecting
the public health and preventing animal cruelty and burdened only conduct relating to the
worship of Santeria. Id. at 543-46. The Court applied strict scrutiny and found that the laws
were not narrowly tailored to the ends they were designed to achieve and, therefore, the laws
were held invalid. Id. at 546-47.
104. Id. at 526-28.
105. See id. at 533 (stating that a law that is not neutral is invalid unless it advances a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest).
106. Id. at 534.
107. Id. at 533.
108. See Derek D. Green, Note, Does Free Exercise Mean Free State Funding? In Davey
v. Locke, the Ninth Circuit Undervalued Washington's Vision ofReligious Liberty, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 653, 665-68 (2003) (discussing the circuit split on whether Lukumi requires an object to
suppress religion).
109. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) ("[W]e simply observe
that... [the law's] original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks
on account of race and the section continues... to have that effect. As such, it violates equal
protection .... ."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) ("Though the law itself
be... impartial in appearance... if it is applied and administered by public authority with an
evil eye and an unequal hand... between persons in similar circumstances... the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.").
110. See Duncan, supra note 94, at 851 (summarizing the Court's approach to Free
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will not apply the compelling interest test unless the object of the law was to
inhibit religion.'
III. Locke v. Davey
A. The Decision
In Locke,'12 the state of Washington, in accordance with its constitution,
denied a general scholarship to a student intending to pursue a degree in
devotional theology."l 3 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,' 14 which had
followed Lukumi to determine that because the law was not facially neutral
towards religion it had to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest." 1 5 The Ninth Circuit decided that the state's antiestablishment interests
were not compelling and held that the program was unconstitutional. 1
6
Lukumi arguably stood for the proposition that a law that is not neutral
"must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.""' 7 In Locke, the
Court did not address whether the law was neutral or generally applicable."' In
Exercise claims after Smith and Lukumi).
111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (addressing this plausible interpretation of
Lukumi).
112. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). Davey brought a claim challenging
Washington's Promise Scholarship Program under the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment
Clause, and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 718. The program offered scholarships to eligible high
school graduates but did not allow the scholarship to be put towards devotional theology
degrees. Id. at 716. Religiously affiliated postsecondary schools could participate if qualified.
Id. The Court's analysis focused on the Religion Clauses, specifically on the Free Exercise
Clause. Id. at 718-19. The Court rejected Davey's claim that the Court should presume the law
unconstitutional under Lukumi because it was not facially neutral with respect to religion. Id. at
720. The Court proceeded to look at the state's interest in denying the scholarship for
devotional theological studies. Id. at 721-23. The Court concluded that "[t]he State's interest
in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding
places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars." Id. at 725. Given these two findings,
the Court upheld the Promise Scholarship Program. Id.
113. See id. at 717 (explaining that the Promise Scholarship was not to be used for degrees
in devotional theology).
114. See id. at 718 (reversing the Ninth Circuit's holding).
115. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748,753, 759-60 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Lukumi and
the compelling interest test), rev'd 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
116. See id. at 760 (finding that Washington's interest was not compelling).
117. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (discussing Lukumi).
118. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 (declining to extend Lukumi).
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fact, the Court refused to extend Lukumi's presumption of unconstitutionality in
the face of a nonneutral law, stating that the "State's disfavor of religion (if it
can be called that) is of a far milder kind" than the disfavor in Lukumi.
1 19
Instead, the Court was concerned with whether the program "suggest[ed]
animus towards religion." 120  This result is not entirely inconsistent with
Lukumi, if the purpose of the neutrality inquiry was to determine whether the
law had an object to target religion for unfavorable treatment.
12'
Rather than apply a compelling interest test, the Court looked at the states'
historical prohibitions on "using tax funds to support the ministry."'122 The
majority concluded that, without a presumption of unconstitutionality, a
substantial state interest was sufficient to justify any minor burdens on religious
exercise. 123 Thus, the Court established that the program fell within the "play
in the joints" where the Establishment Clause would allow inclusion of
devotional theology degrees, but inclusion was not compelled by the Free
Exercise Clause because of the state's historic and substantial interest in
excluding such degrees.
124
The Locke case is similar to a case that would arise from a challenge to a
school aid program that excludes religious schools. Locke indicates that the
Court might not extend a presumption of unconstitutionality to such a program
unless the program indicated a purpose to suppress religion. 2 5 The opinion is
not entirely clear as to how the substantial interest component fits in, 126 but it
appears that in a challenge to a state funding decision that excludes religious
recipients, a state will have to point to a substantial interest, either to avoid
119. Id.at 720.
120. Id. at 725.
121. See Katie Axtell, Note, Public Funding for Theological Training Under the Free
Exercise Clause: Pragmatic Implications and Theoretical Questions Posed to the Supreme
Court in Locke v. Davey, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 585, 613 (2003) (stating that "a free exercise
inquiry... [focuses] on how non-neutral laws prohibit religious observers' belief or practice");
infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (suggesting that Lukumi was concerned with official
targeting of religion with intent to suppress).
122. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723.
123. See id. at 725 (upholding the Promise Scholarship Program).
124. See id. ("If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here.").
125. See id. (concluding that the Washington Promise Scholarship Program was not
constitutionally suspect given the state's historic and substantial interest and the lack of a
suggestion of animus towards religion).
126. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 173 ("[T]he Court relied on this [historic and
substantial] interest to conclude that the ... refusal to fund was not presumptively
unconstitutional... and then relied on the same interest to justify the discrimination under
the... more deferential standard that applied .... ").
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Lukumi's presumption of unconstitutionality or to dispel any indication of
animus toward religion. 127
B. Locke's Impact on School Aid Challenges
The use of a substantial interest test puts some burden on a state to defend
its funding decisions.128 A state's justification will likely relate to a historical
interest in avoiding government establishment of religion. 129 Applying the
decision in the school aid context requires an understanding of which
religiously-affiliated activities present historical and substantial establishment
concerns such that the government can constitutionally draw distinctions within
funding programs. 130 For example, the Court may require only a tenuous
connection to historical establishment concerns, in which case avoiding
government support of sectarian schools clearly relates to a historic and
substantial interest and the state will receive the leeway granted in Locke.'3'
Also, the opinion offered no insight on how changes in the Court's
interpretation of federal and state establishment clauses might affect what
concerns are considered historic or substantial.
The Locke decision was narrowly written in that the Court focused its
analysis on the particular exclusion at issue, the exclusion of devotional
theology majors. 132 The Court stated that "training for religious professions and
training for secular professions are not fungible" and that preparing to lead a
congregation is "essentially a religious endeavor."' 33 The Court believed that
devotional theology is something so distinct from other studies that states
constitutionally could treat devotional theology studies differently from other
127. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12 (stating that "[t]o enjoy the deference recognized by
the Court in Locke, a state will need to show that its funding restriction arises from a concern
similar to Washington's ban").
128. See id. (discussing how a state would go about defending a free exercise challenge to a
program that excludes religious recipients).
129. See id. (stating that in defending a Free Exercise challenge to a school aid program, a
state will point to historical prohibitions on religious funding and the Locke decision).
130. See Jennifer G. Hickey, Faithfully Upholding the Law, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Jan. 5,
2004, at 14 (stating that "[t]he impact of Locke v. Davey will be determined by how broad or
how narrow the court.., tailors its opinion").
131. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12 (wondering what interests will meet the Locke test
and afford the government the deference of Locke).
132. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004) (limiting its analysis to the different
treatment received by those training to enter the ministry).
133. Id.
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studies. 134 Essentially, the Court viewed the purpose of such studies to be
preparation for the ministry. 35 This view led the Court to consider the states'
historic interests in prohibiting tax dollars from being used to support the
clergy; this is the basis upon which the Court sustained the Promise Scholarship
Program.
136
The Court's analysis did not offer a broad understanding of the areas in
which states may possess substantial antiestablishment concerns. It is possible
to argue that states do not have either a historic or a substantial
antiestablishment interest in excluding religious schools from aid programs.
Indeed, many public schools continued to incorporate Protestant values through
the middle of the twentieth century.137 This weighs against any argument of a
historical interest in not funding schools of a religious character.
1 38
Additionally, some commentators have wondered whether the Court's recent
school aid decisions have left room for legitimate establishment concerns
related to such programs. 139 If the Court has removed any establishment
concerns surrounding school aid programs that are neutral and allow true
private choice, does a state have a substantial interest in structuring aid
programs to exclude religious schools? The Court has repeatedly used
language indicating that it sees no Establishment Clause issues when these
conditions are present.
40
A challenger to a school aid program that excludes religious institutions
might draw support from Court cases that appear to reject government aid
diverted towards religious schools as an area that may present substantial
134. See id. ("That a State would deal differently with religious education for the ministry
than with education for other callings is a product of [the] views [embodied in the United States
and state constitutions] .... ").
135. See id. (describing majoring in devotional theology as "[t]raining... to lead a
congregation").
136. See id. at 721-23 (comparing majoring in devotional theology to a religious calling
and tracing historic prohibitions against the use of taxes to support the ministry).
137. See supra notes 29-3 3 and accompanying text (discussing the Protestant practices that
were incorporated into public schooling).
138. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 184-85 (arguing that the historical interest against
funding the clergy would not apply to the exclusion of sectarian schools from school voucher
programs that pay for secular private education and arguing that there is no historical tradition
of refusing to fund education involving religious content).-
139. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 478 ("[T]he question remains whether the
Establishment Clause is even relevant in determining the constitutionality of government aid to
religious schools.").
140. See id. at 478 (questioning the existence of Establishment Clause concerns); infra
notes 141-50 and accompanying text (addressing the Supreme Court's rejection of any
Establishment Clause implications of properly structured school aid programs).
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antiestablishment concerns. The plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helm14 '
suggested that excluding sectarian elementary and secondary schools from aid
programs might be unconstitutional. 142 In Mitchell, the Court had to decide
Whether Chapter 2, a government aid program, had the effect of advancing
religion. 143 This question required the Court to decide whether Chapter 2 either
"result[ed] in religious indoctrination by the government"'144 or "define[d] its
recipients by reference to religion."'145 Its decision that the program did not
advance religion rested on the principles of true private choice and neutrality. 46
According to the Court:
If aid to schools, even "direct aid," is neutrally available and, before
reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes through the hands
(literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to direct
the aid elsewhere, the government has not provided any "support of
religion."(citations omitted)
147
The Court decided that if the government offers aid to a wide variety of
schools, it is not responsible for any religious indoctrination but is instead
furthering a common secular purpose. 48 The Court also stressed that private
141. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion). Mitchell involved a
challenge to an aid program known as Chapter 2 as implemented in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.
Id. at 801-02. Chapter 2 provided federal funds "for the acquisition and use of instructional and
educational materials," to be distributed to participating elementary and secondary schools
through local educational agencies. Id. at 802 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7351 (b)(2) (1994)). Both
public and private schools, including religious schools, could participate in the program and the
aid was to be distributed equitably between students in both types of schools. In Jefferson
Parish, for the fiscal year 1986-87, only five of forty-six participating private schools had no
religious affiliation. Id. at 803. The Court held that "Chapter 2 is not a law respecting the
establishment of religion." Id. at 835. The Court's decision rested on its belief that "Chapter 2
does not result in governmental indoctrination, because it determines eligibility for aid neutrally,
allocates that aid based on the private choices of the parents.., and does not provide aid that
has an impermissible content." Id. at 829.
142. In a footnote, the Court admitted that that exclusion of religious schools from Chapter
2 might raise Free Exercise questions. Id. at 835 n. 19.
143. See id. at 808 (stating that there was no issue over whether Chapter 2 had a secular




146. See id. at 809-10 (discussing how neutrality and private choice in a government aid
program severs any connection between government and the religious message of any
participating private schools).
147. Id. at 816.
148. See id. at 809-10 (discussing how a neutral and generally applicable aid program
furthers a secular purpose).
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choice ensures neutrality and relieves the government of responsibility for
where the aid eventually goes. 149 The Court similarly rejected the possible
perception of government endorsement of religion in Zelman. 
50
In the Mitchell plurality opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that "the
application of the 'pervasively sectarian' factor collides with our decisions that
have prohibited governments from discriminating in the distribution of public
benefits based upon religious status,"'151 and that excluding pervasively
sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs violates certain
Court doctrines. 52 Justice Thomas has indicated that exclusion of sectarian
elementary and secondary schools from state aid programs is religious
discrimination. 53 One could argue that Justice Thomas's position is true to the
Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as the Court has negated all
historically recognized antiestablishment reasons for excluding religious
schools from state aid programs.
1 54
Justice O'Connor challenged this argument in her Mitchell concurrence.
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality that neutrality should take on
singular importance. 55 She also disagreed with the proposition that the
Establishment Clause is not violated when sectarian schools divert aid towards
149. See id. at 811 (stating that "private choice[] help[s] to ensure neutrality, and neutrality
and private choices together eliminate[] any possible attribution to the government").
150. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,655 (2002) (stating that "no reasonable
observer would think a neutral aid program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious
schools solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries
with it the imprimatur of government endorsement").
151. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828 (plurality opinion).
152. See id. at 829 (indicating that hostility to pervasively sectarian schools developed
from anti-Catholic bias).
153. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Locke. Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The justices would have found the denial of
the scholarship to constitute religious discrimination. Id. That only two justices joined in the
dissent suggests that, if the court were to address a Free Exercise challenge to an exclusionary
school aid program a majority of the Justices would not apply this dicta from Mitchell that such
an exclusion is automatically invalid. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 185-86 (stating that
"[Locke] is likely to lead to a more general principle that all religious programs and institutions
can be excluded from funding programs"). Still, the language of the Mitchell opinion is an
accurate depiction of the Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which nullifies
any establishment concerns relating to programs that satisfy the requirements of neutrality and
true private choice.
154. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing whether states' provision
of aid to sectarian schools raises concerns in the wake of cases like Mitchell and Zelman).
155. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that neutrality
had previously been one of several factors used by the Court to determine Establishment Clause
challenges to school aid programs).
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religious uses. 156 Even after Zelman, it is unclear whether possible diversion of
government aid will play a decisive role in future Establishment Clause
cases. 157  If these are potential areas of concern, then the Court has not
extinguished all establishment issues surrounding school aid for sectarian
schools.
If the Court does allow the exclusion of religious schools based on
Establishment Clause concerns, it will have to reconcile its decision with cases
such as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia'58 and
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,159 which
addressed the government's ability to exclude religious recipients from
government-created public forums for speech. 160 In both of these cases, the
Court rejected Establishment Clause defenses to free speech claims.'6 ' In
Rosenberger, the Court relied on the principle of neutrality to find that the use
of student funds to pay for a religiously-focused publication did not pose any
156. See id. at 837-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that "the plurality's approval of
actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is in tension with our
precedents").
157. See Anthony T. Kovalchick, Educational Aid Programs Under the Establishment
Clause: The Need for the U.S. Supreme Court to Adopt the Rule Proposed by the Mitchell
Plurality, 30 S.U. L. REv. 117, 149 (2003) (arguing that the Court should not follow
O'Connor's distinction between direct and indirect aid, which would require that courts ensure
that direct aid is not diverted for religious uses).
158. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995). See
infra notes 216-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rosenberger.
159. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Lamb's
Chapel involved a Free Speech challenge to a school district's refusal to allow a church group
to show a video on school premises that were otherwise available for use by the community. Id.
at 386-87. Pursuant to a New York state law, the School District allowed "social, civic and
recreational meetings and entertainments" to be held on school property. Id. at 386 (citing N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 414(c) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993)). The Lamb's Chapel Church had
requested use of the school facilities to show a film series taking Christian perspectives. Id. at
387-88. The School District, in order to comply with a state court decision, would not allow
the school property to be used for religious purposes. Id. at 387. Thus, it did not permit Lamb's
Chapel to use the facilities. Id. at 388-89. The Court found that the school district had denied
use of the facilities because of the religious nature of the films. Id. at 394. The Court held that
the denial violated the First Amendment. Id. The government could not favor certain
viewpoints by exclusion of others. Id. The Court also rejected the district's Establishment
Clause defense. Id. at 395. It found that there was no real risk that the public would perceive
such use as government endorsement of religion. Id.
160. See infra notes 216-27 (discussing Rosenberger's Free Speech analysis).
161. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842 (rejecting the University's Establishment Clause
defense); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (rejecting the District's Establishment Clause
defense).
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threat of violating the Establishment Clause.162 This argument is analogous to
the one that a challenger to a school aid program could credibly make.
163
There are two ways to distinguish Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel from a
suit challenging a school aid program that excludes religious schools. The key
distinction is that both are free speech cases and both decisions rest on the
principle that the government may not differentiate between speakers on the
basis of their viewpoints. 164 In Locke, the Court rejected a free speech
challenge to the Promise Scholarship Program, finding it was not a forum for
speech. 165 If the Promise Scholarship Program is not a forum for speech, then a
school aid program is unlikely to be a forum for speech.'
66
Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel are also distinguishable because in those
cases the Court was concerned with whether including the religious activities
within the programs at issue would violate the Establishment Clause. 167 In
Locke, the Court allowed Washington to defend the Promise Scholarship
Program based on a substantial Establishment Clause-related interest rather
than requiring the state to show that funding devotional theology degrees would
violate the Establishment Clause or even its own constitution. 168 Thus, under
Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel, the government had a higher burden to carry.
The overall effect of Locke on Free Exercise challenges to school aid
programs will not become clear until the Court applies its new analysis in
future challenges. It is unlikely that a challenge to a government aid program
162. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-42 (finding that the neutrality of the disputed
program would prevent any perception that the State was supporting religious viewpoints).
163. See supra note 141-50 and accompanying text (discussing the principles of neutrality
and true private choice, which a challenger could argue to negate an Establishment Clause
defense).
164. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995)
(finding that the program at issue violated the Free Speech Clause); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at
393-94 (finding that the District had violated the First Amendment by excluding a presentation
from a public forum solely on the basis of its religious viewpoint).
165. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004) (stating that "the Promise
Scholarship Program is not a forum for speech").
166. A university is arguably closer to a forum for speech than an elementary or secondary
school. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 (stating that "student expression is an integral part of
the University's educational mission").
167. See id. at 845-46 (requiring the University of Virginia to include publications taking a
religious viewpoint in a student funding program because it would not violate the Establishment
Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993)
(finding that there is no Establishment Clause defense for excluding a religious viewpoint from
a public forum if the inclusion of that point of view would not violate the Establishment
Clause).
168. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 719 (finding that Washington could, under the Federal
Constitution, allow the Promise Scholarship to be used for degrees in devotional theology).
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that excludes all religious institutions can succeed, 169 unless the program exhibits
"animus toward religion." 170 Much of the reasoning that led the Court to sustain the
program in Locke is equally applicable to all school aid programs. The Court did
not extend Lukumi's presumption that a law is unconstitutional when it is not
facially neutral with respect to religion.' 7' Instead, it found that the disfavor of
religion was mild compared to criminal or civil sanctions. 172 The disfavor of
religion in a school voucher case is also mild when compared to criminal or civil
sanctions. The Court also stated that "religious instruction is of a different ilk'
73
and that a state may choose to fund one type of instruction without funding a
different type of instruction. 174 The instruction provided at religious elementary and
secondary schools is arguably distinctive from secular instruction because many of
these schools incorporate religion into all aspects of education. 17' Finally, the
history of the Establishment Clause and cases like Everson 76 establish some historic
state interest in not funding religious schooling.
177
Locke also demonstrates that the govemment does not unconstitutionally
inhibit free exercise when it funds nonreligious activities without funding similar
religious activities. 17  The Court could extend Locke's reasoning to hold that aslong as the state has a legitimate interest for excluding religious activities 179 from a
169. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12 (asserting that "Locke gives states significant
freedom to fashion independent policies of church-state relations"); infra Parts V.C-D
(discussing why Locke's analysis should be expanded into the school voucher context).
170. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,725 (2004) (finding that the Promise Scholarship
Program did not exhibit any animus toward religion).
171. See id. at 720 (declining to extend Lukumi's presumption of unconstitutionality for
laws that are not facially neutral with respect to religion).
172. See id. (declining to extend Lukumi's presumption of unconstitutionality for laws that
are not facially neutral with respect to religion).
173. Id. at 723.
174. See id. at 721 ("The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of
instruction.").
175. See Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 391 (1985) (stating that "the
parochial school's total operation serves to fulfill both secular and religious functions
concurrently, and the two cannot be completely separated") (quoting Donald A. Gianella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 1H. The
Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 574 (1968)).
176. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
177. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions.").
178. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text (highlighting the conditional funding
language used in Locke).
179. This analysis applies only to programs that fund an activity and deny funding for that
activity when it is religiously-affiliated. It does not apply to programs that deny otherwise
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funding program and the exclusion is not based on animus, the exclusion is
constitutional because of the insignificance of any burden. In Locke, after
disctissing the government interest involved, the Court stated that "[flar from
evincing... hostility toward religion ... we believe that the... Program goes a
long way toward including religion in its benefits."180 The Court may have only
been looking for a justification demonstrating that the state did not act with
discriminatory intent. Therefore, an Establishment Clause concern, even one that
relates to action that the Establishment Clause clearly does not prohibit, like giving
aid to religious schools, should suffice as long as it is not pretext. The validity of
this interpretation depends, in part, on the Court's interpretation of what the Free
Exercise Clause requires.' 81 Parts IV and V address this interpretation of Locke and
its potential application in school voucher cases. 1
82
IV. Burdens on Fundamental Constitutional Rights
A. Conditional Funding and Locke
An unconstitutional condition question "[is] said to emerge whenever
government conditions a benefit it is not obligated to provide on waiver of a
constitutional right."183 At its base, the question is whether "carrying out the act
threatened may be unconstitutional even though the state is constitutionally
permitted not to advance the offer in the first place."' 84 In other words, when can
the government make a benefit available and deny it to those who exercise a
particular constitutional right? 185 While the doctrine has the laudable purpose of
preventing the government from "do[ing] indirectly what it may not do directly,"1
8 6
neither the courts nor scholars have been able to approach a consensus on how the
doctrine should be applied. 1
87
available funding based on a recipient's adherence to a set of religious beliefs. In the school aid
context, individuals may still practice any religion and receive aid for secular education.
180. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724 (2004).
181. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Court's current interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause).
182. See infra Parts IV & V (discussing the conditional funding analysis).
183. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2001).
184. Id. at 19.
185. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413,
1415 (1989) (defining the unconstitutional condition doctrine).
186. Id.
187. See id. (stating that there is confusion on how to apply the unconstitutional condition
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The Court has stated that "[t]he Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without ... funding an alternative program."' 88 A statute
will, however, be subject to strict scrutiny if it "interfere[s] with the exercise of a
fundamental right."' 89 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been put forth
by voucher advocates as one potential argument for invalidating state voucher
programs that exclude religious schools.' 90 This is a key argument for voucher
advocates because the doctrine "is the primary method by which the Court
distinguishes permissible denials of benefits from impermissible denials."'
19 1
In Locke, the Court indicated that government funding that excludes religious
organizations falls into the permissible funding category. The Court recognized that
Lukumi could be understood to mean that a criminal law "is presumptively
unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion."'
192
However, the Court refused to extend that reasoning to cover the situation in
Locke.' 93 The Court referred to devotional theology as a "distinct category of
instruction"'194 and stated that the Promise Scholarship Program excluded such
degrees because they are so distinct from other kinds of degrees. 95 The Court
upheld the exclusion of devotional theology degrees because the exclusion did not
indicate "animus toward religion"'196 and the burden on religion was "relatively
minor."'197 One question raised by Locke is whether this reasoning is applicable to a
Free Exercise challenge to a school aid program. In other words, is the facial
neutrality principle equally inapplicable to voucher cases? If it is, then a voucher
program that excludes religious schools does not impose an unconstitutional
condition on free exercise rights, and the program will be valid unless it violates the
Free Exercise Clause in some other way. This question can be addressed after a
discussion of a few significant conditional funding cases.
doctrine); see also Berman, supra note 183, at 3 ("The persistent challenge... has been to
articulate some coherent or at least intelligible principles or tests.").
188. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
189. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983).
190. See Berg, supra note 9, at 172 ("Challengers argue that the exclusion of religious-
school choices from a voucher program is an unconstitutional condition.... ").
191. Id. at 171.
192. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004).
193. See id. (stating that applying the rule from Lukumi "would extend ... [that] line of
cases well beyond... their reasoning").
194. Id. at 721.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 725.
197. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 (finding that the Promise Scholarship Program is
constitutional even though it may place some burden on religious recipients).
1296
TAKING IT OUT OF NEUTRAL
B. Conditional Funding Cases
1. Sherbert v. Verner
In Sherbert v. Verner,'98 the issue was whether the State of South Carolina
violated the appellant's First Amendment right to free exercise by denying her
unemployment compensation benefits because, in accordance with her religious
beliefs, she would not accept work on Saturdays.'99 Appellant was a Seventh-Day
Adventist who had been fired from herjob at a textile mill for her refusal to work on
Saturdays.200 The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied her
unemployment benefits based on a provision disqualifying claimants who refused
suitable work without good cause.20'
The Supreme Court reasoned that the disqualification would be constitutional
either if it did not infringe on the appellant's right to free exercise or if any
incidental burden on her free exercise could be justified by a "compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate." 202 The Court stated that "[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege., 20 3 This statement presents the basic idea of
unconstitutional condition analysis. The Court found that the appellant's right to
free exercise had been burdened because she was left with a choice of either
following her beliefs and being denied benefits or violating her own religious
beliefs. 204 The Court also found that the state offered no compelling interest to
justify the burden.20 5 The Court held that the state's actions violated the Free
Exercise Clause.206 The holding suggested that even if the government is under no
obligation to fund a person's constitutional rights, a denial of funding may create an
unconstitutional infringement on constitutional rights.20 7
198. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
199. Id. at 399-401.
200. Id. at 399.
201. Id. at 400-01.
202. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
203. Id. at 404.
204. See id. (explaining why the disqualification burdened the appellant's free exercise of
her religious beliefs).
205. See id. at 406-07 (stating that no compelling state interest had been advanced by
South Carolina to "justift[y] the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right").
206. See id. at 410 ("Our holding today is only that South Carolina may not
constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his
religious convictions respecting the day of rest.").
207. But see Sullivan, supra note 185, at 1435-37 (arguing that cases like Sherbert, in
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2. Harris v. McRae
In Harris v. McRae, ° the plaintiffs argued that the Hyde Amendment, which
denied federal funding for medically necessary abortions, impinged upon their
protected liberty interest in deciding to terminate a pregnancy. 0 9 The Court rejected
this argument because the Hyde Amendment "place[d] no governmental obstacle in
the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather...
encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest."21° The Court declined
which the Supreme Court has found a penalty on a constitutional right, "have left a limited
legacy"). In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), the Court reviewed the Sherbert holding and clarified its scope. Id. at 882-85.
According to Smith, the Sherbert compelling interest test for benefits denials that burdened
religious exercise was suited for "a context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct." Id. at 884. The Court declined to use the
test to require exemptions from generally applicable criminal laws. Id. It interpreted Sherbert
to mean that where a benefit program already provides individual exemptions, the state must
have a compelling interest for not allowing exemptions for religious reasons. Id. Justice Scalia
was acutely aware of the potential impact of a ruling allowing individuals to claim exemption
from generally applicable laws meant to prevent "socially harmful conduct." Id. at 885. The
opinion did not address the appropriate test for government action that falls within the extremes
represented by Sherbert and Smith. Id. at 884-85. It did, however, distinguish free speech
cases, stating that a compelling interest test serves to "produce[] ... an unrestricted flow of
contending speech... [which is a] constitutional norm[]." Id. at 886.
208. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The Court addressed two issues. The first
issue was "whether Title XIX requires a State that participates in the Medicaid program to fund
the cost of medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable." Id.
at 301. If there was no such requirement, the second issue was whether the denial of funding for
some medically necessary abortions would violate either due process or equal protection under
the Fifth Amendment, or the Religion Clauses. Id. The case had developed into a class action
suit "on behalf of all pregnant and potentially pregnant women eligible for Medicaid who wish
to have medically necessary abortions, and of all authorized providers of abortions for such
women." Id. at 306. On the first issue, the Supreme Court reasoned that because Title XIX was
a program of "cooperative federalism," it did not intend for a participating State to fund any
service for which federal funds are unavailable. Id. at 308-09. The Court held that, absent
contrary legislative intent, "Title XIX does not require a participating State to pay for those
medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde
Amendment." Id. at 311. On the second issue, the plaintiffs argued that the Hyde Amendment,
which denied federal funding for medically necessary abortions, impinged upon their protected
liberty interest in deciding to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 312. The Court rejected this
argument, finding that the Hyde Amendment "place[d] no governmental obstacle in the path of a
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather... encourages alternative activity
deemed in the public interest." Id. at 315. The Court did not consider whether the asserted
interest, the freedom to choose to terminate a pregnancy for health reasons, was a central
"constitutional liberty." Id. at 316. It relied on the idea that the government "need not remove
those [obstacles] not of its own creation." Id.
209. Id. at 312.
210. Id.at315.
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to consider whether the asserted interest, the freedom to choose to terminate a
pregnancy for health reasons, was a "constitutional liberty" as defined in prior
cases.211 Instead, it found that the government "need not remove those [obstacles]
not of its own creation." 212 The Court's reasoning rested on the fear that requiring
such funding would require the government to subsidize every fundamental right.
213
The Court distinguished its holding in Sherbert because in that case the law
required a broad disqualification from benefits for engaging in constitutionally-
protected activity; McRae, the Court noted, involved a refusal to subsidize the
activity.214 The Court indicated that a disqualification is broad when the benefit
denied is unrelated to the exercise of a fundamental right, like in Sherbert, where the
government was funding the cost of unemployment.215
3. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,2 16 the
issue was whether the University had violated the free speech and free
exercise rights of a group of students who were denied reimbursement for
printing costs from a student activities fund because its publication was
considered a "religious activity. 21 7 The Supreme Court held that the denial
211. Id. at 316.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 318 (arguing that just because the government may not prohibit certain
activities does not mean that it should have an obligation to fund those activities).
214. Id. at 317 n.19.
215. See id. (distinguishing McRae from Sherbert).
216. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). The
University allowed access to its facilities to student organizations that received "Contracted
Independent Organization" (CIO) status. Id. at 823. The petitioners' group, Wide Awake
Productions, received CIO status. Id. at 826. Some CIOs were eligible to receive funding from
a student activities fund, which was intended to foster educational activities within the
University. Id. at 824. Funding could be allotted to, among others, "student news, information,
opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups." Id. at 824 (internal
quotations omitted). Excluded from funding were religious activities, which included
petitioners' publication, Wide Awake. Id. at 825-27. The issue was whether the University had
violated students' free speech and free exercise rights by denying Wide Awake Productions
reimbursement for printing costs because its publication was considered a "religious activity."
Id. at 827. The Supreme Court held that the denial violated the students' constitutional right to
free speech. Id. at 837. The Court concluded that the University had created a public forum
through the student activities fund and that the University had engaged in viewpoint-based
discrimination by rejecting an otherwise acceptable publication because of its religious
perspective. Id. at 830-31. The Court rejected the University's Establishment Clause defense.
Id. at 845-46.
217. Id. at 827.
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violated the students' constitutional right to free speech.218 The Court
concluded that the University had created a public forum through the student
activities fund and that the University had engaged in viewpoint-based
discrimination by rejecting an otherwise acceptable publication because of its
religious perspective.
219
According to the Rosenberger Court; an individual's speech may be
restricted when the government is using that speaker to convey a
governmental message or policy determination but may not be restricted
when the government action is intended to "encourage private speech.,
220
The Court concluded that the student activities fund was intended to
encourage private speech rather than convey its own message because the
University took measures to ensure that the points of view of student
organizations were not considered the views of the University. 22' Thus, the
University was discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.222
The Court rejected the University's Establishment Clause defense.
223
The Court noted that the program was neutral with respect to religion and
stated that it had previously "rejected the position that the Establishment
Clause even justifies ... a refusal to extend free speech rights to religious
speakers who participate in broad-reaching government programs neutral in
design. 2 24 It found that the student activities fund was not at all similar to a
general assessment used to support a church or particular religious sect.225
The Court also highlighted that the funds would not go to any religious
institution 226 and that any benefit to religion would be "incidental to the
government's provision of secular services for secular purposes.
2 27
218. Id. at 837.
219. Id. at 830-31.
220. Id. at 833.
221. Id. at 834-35.
222. See id. at 834 ("The University's regulation now before us... has a speech-based
restriction as its sole rationale and operative principle.").
223. See id. at 845-46 ("To obey the Establishment Clause, it was not necessary for the
University to deny eligibility to student publications because of their viewpoint.").
224. Id. at 839.
225. See id. at 840-41 (finding that the student activity fee "is a far cry from a general
public assessment designed and effected to provide financial support for a church").
226. See id. at 842 ("We do not confront a case where.., the government is making direct
money payments to an institution or group that is engaged in religious activity.").
227. Id. at 843-44.
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V. Rejecting Unconstitutional Condition Analysis: Why the Neutrality
Principle Should Not Be Extended to School Voucher Cases
A. Introduction
A review of the unconstitutional conditions cases shows that the Court has
no firm doctrinal basis for its decisions.228 As the discussion of the cases
shows, the Court has often relied on fact-based distinctions between the cases
rather than invoking established doctrine. For example, Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith229 and McRae both distinguished
Sherbert based on differences between the types of laws or benefits involved.2 3 °
Locke's reasoning for finding a constitutional condition arguably went
along the following lines: Neutrality is not an appropriate standard for
determining the constitutionality of the Promise Scholarship Program,23' the
state has come forward with an interest in denying funding for devotional
theology degrees, 232 and the program does not reflect "animus towards
religion,"233 and therefore, the program is constitutional.2 34 The question is
whether the conditional funding analysis from Locke should be extended to
school voucher cases. The answer depends, in part, on the relationship between
neutrality and conditional funding.
This Note argues that the Court should extend its reasoning in Locke235 to
school voucher cases. Neutrality is not the appropriate standard for deciding
school funding cases brought under the Free Exercise Clause. States arguably
have a nondiscriminatory reason for excluding religious schools from
government aid programs that could dispel an accusation of animus toward
228. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (addressing the lack of a satisfactory mode
of analysis for unconstitutional conditions cases).
229. See supra note 207 (discussing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) and how it distinguished Sherbert).
230. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court
distinguished Sherbert from McRae).
231. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (discussing Locke's treatment of the
neutrality principle).
232. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722-23 (2004) (discussing the state's interest in
not funding degrees in devotional theology). It is possible to interpret the Court's "substantial
interest" analysis as intending to show a legitimate state interest that rules out a motivation of
animus toward religion. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (addressing this
possibility).
233. Id. at 725.
234. See id. (finding the challenge to the program could not be sustained).
235. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning behind the
Court's conditional funding analysis in Locke).
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religion.236 Therefore, absent affirmative proof of animus, the government
should be able to differentiate between the two distinct goods that are secular
and sectarian education and advance secular education without violating the
Free Exercise Clause.237 The next section discusses the central role that
neutrality plays in finding an unconstitutional condition.238 This Note will then
try to demonstrate that excluding religious schools from voucher or school aid
programs does not automatically violate the Free Exercise Clause because the
239
neutrality principle does serve the Free Exercise Clause's true purpose.
B. Neutrality and Conditional Funding
One potentially useful principle for distinguishing between constitutional
and unconstitutional conditions is neutrality. A condition is unconstitutional if
the distinction is one the government should be prohibited from drawing.24°
Neutrality may provide a useful basis for distinguishing abortion cases from
236. In Locke, the Court looked to historical prohibitions on funding the ministry to find a
"substantial state interest" in not funding devotional theology degrees. See Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712, 722-23 (2004) (quoting various state prohibitions on funding the ministry). It is
unclear how the Court intends to use the "historic and substantial state interest" factor from
Locke in future cases. Id. at 725. An argument can be made that the Court should not find
states' interests in excluding religious schools from voucher programs to be substantial. See
supra Part III.B (discussing how the reasoning in Locke would apply to a school voucher cases
and exploring ways to argue that denying funding to religious schools would serve no
substantial state interest). It may be that the Court was only concerned with corroborating its
finding of lack of animus. Prohibitions on funding religious schools arguably provide a
legitimate interest for excluding religious schools from government funding programs. See
Berg, supra note 9, at 167 (discussing state provisions that bar aid to sectarian schools). In
addition, states can point to Establishment Clause jurisprudence that espoused a "no aid to
religion" philosophy to argue that their actions were taken due to an adoption of that
philosophy, not antireligious motivation. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 448 (noting the strict
interpretation of "no aid to religion" formerly used by the Court).
237. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 79, at 1978 (discussing the Supreme Court's "fairly weak"
approach to enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and stating that "[a]bsent discriminatory intent,
the political branches may decide whether they wish to permit government assistance for
religious activities").
238. See infra Part V.B (discussing the relationship between neutrality and the
unconstitutional condition doctrine).
239. See infra Part V.C (arguing that neutrality should not govern Free Exercise challenges
to school aid programs that exclude religious schools and arguing that, under the appropriate
test, such programs do not necessarily violate the Free Exercise Clause).
240. See Sullivan, supra note 185, at 1506 (stating that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine "bars redistribution of constitutional rights as to which government has obligations of
evenhandedness").
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speech cases. 24' The government is under no constitutional mandate to treat
abortion and childbirth neutrally.242 However, "[i]n the realm of private speech
or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over
another., 243 Because of this neutrality requirement, the government may not
open a forum for speech and selectively cut out one particular point of view.
244
In the abortion context, the government may choose between funding two
entirely different services.245 It follows that, in the school voucher context, one
question to be asked is whether the government may fund private education and
selectively cut out funding for religious schools. The answer to this question
depends on whether the government may favor secular education over sectarian
education. If school funding cases are governed by the neutrality principle,
then the government may not favor one activity over the other.
Professor Douglas Laycock argues that the "government should be
substantively neutral toward religion. 246 Substantive neutrality means that the
government should "[n]either encourage[] [n]or discourage[] religious belief or
disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance., 247 According
to Laycock, "[m]inimizing the influence of government maximizes the freedom
to make religious choices. ' 248 To Laycock, Locke was an easy case; the
government was being nonneutral by treating unfavorably a devotional activity,
and therefore, the program was discriminatory.249
One flaw Laycock finds in the Court's opinion is the conditional funding
analogy it draws with abortion cases like McRae.250 The analogy is flawed, he
says, because "[t]he right to choose abortion is a right to be free of undue
241. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 176 (arguing against the outcome in Locke and stating
that "because the Court has never required [the] government to be neutral toward abortion, the
implicit analogy to abortion is fundamentally flawed").
242. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991) ("[T]he government may 'make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and... implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds."' (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977))).
243. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
244. See id. at 829 ("The government must abstain from regulating speech when the
specific ... perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.").
245. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-93 (discussing the government's prerogative to choose
between advocating childbirth or abortion).
246. Laycock, supra note 16, at 160.
247. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001 (1990).
248. Laycock, supra note 16, at 160-61.
249. See id. at 171-72 (arguing that the Promise Scholarship Program was a clear violation
of the Smith and Lukumi line of cases).
250. See id. at 176-77 (criticizing the Court for applying abortion cases to religious liberty
cases).
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burdens; the right to religious liberty is a right to government neutrality. '251
Under this argument, the condition in Locke is unconstitutional because it is
based on a distinction the government may not draw.
2 2
C. Rejecting Neutrality
The Court has been wary of obligating the government to fund individuals
in the exercise of their constitutional rights.253 In fact, the Court rarely finds a
condition attached to a funding program to be unconstitutional.254 One
situation in which the Court will find an unconstitutional condition is when a
funding program favors one right over another in an area where the government
is required to act neutrally. 255 Professor Laycock argues "that the government
should be substantively neutral toward religion" and that the program at issue in
Locke did not meet this requirement. 56 Thus, Laycock would place Locke with
the free speech line of cases, in the sense that government neutrality is
required. 7
Professor Frank S. Ravitch has identified various problems created by the
neutrality principle. 58 Ravitch writes that the Supreme Court has made the
ideal of"formal neutrality" the driving principle in cases involving government
251. Id. at 177.
252. See id. (arguing that the condition in Locke was unconstitutional because the
government "cannot make a value judgment that secularism is better than religious faith").
253. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (stating that finding it
unconstitutional for the Government to ban the use of federal funds by programs that perform or
advise on abortions "would render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect");
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) ("To translate the limitation on governmental power
implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require
Congress to subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman.... ").
254. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 175 (stating that most funding cases are not found to
present an unconstitutional condition).
255. See Sullivan, supra note 185, at 1506 (stating that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine "bars redistribution of constitutional rights as to which government has obligations of
evenhandedness").
256. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 160-61 (stating that "[t]he government's conduct
failed this neutrality test in... [Locke]"). One could argue that since one of the Court's
concerns in Locke seemed to be whether strict neutrality was the governing principle, Laycock's
position is begging the question.
257. See id. at 199 ("Under a strong neutrality rule, the state could not cut funds to
religious private education without also cutting funds to secular private education.").
258. See generally Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality:
Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489 (2004)
(discussing the neutrality principle).
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aid to religious schools. 259 He defines formal neutrality as a "focus[] on the
facial neutrality of government action, and on the role private choice plays in
directing government aid to religious entities in the aid context. ' 260  This
principle has become central in both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause cases.26' Professor Laycock's "substantive neutrality'262 differs from the
Court's formal neutrality but still suffers from similar shortcomings.263
Ravitch criticizes neutrality as being too simplistic to be a guiding
principle in a complex area of the law. 264 He finds it to be too simplistic
because absolute neutrality is an impossible ideal.265 One of Ravitch's main
points is that determining the neutrality of a program requires a neutral baseline
from which to judge the effects, of the program; 266 the problem, as defined by
Ravitch, is that a neutral baseline simply does not.exist.267 For the Court to
conclude that neutral treatment requires equal treatment, it must assume "that
religion has no special status," such that including religiously-oriented
organizations in funding programs will lead to neutrality.268 The result of equal
treatment can, however, be nonneutral because extending a benefit to religion
may actually tend to favor religious activity over nonreligious activity, though
this determination is often a difficult one to make.269 The crux of Ravitch's
argument is that:
Since there is no neutral foundation or baseline that can be used to prove
that something is "truly" neutral, neutrality is nothing more than a
259. Id. at 491-93 (discussing the Court's adoption of formal neutrality in Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause cases).
260. Id. at 493.
261. See supra Parts II.B-C (discussing recent Establishment and Free Exercise cases).
262. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (defining substantive neutrality).
263. See Ravitch, supra note 258, at 505 ("[W]hile Professor Laycock may have made a
wise choice among potential baselines, his choice and the resulting baseline are no more neutral
than the Court's formal neutrality.").
264. Id. at 495-96 (advocating the view that "a... simple principle can never be applied to
a state of things which is the reverse of simple") (quoting Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 2 (1961)).
265. Id. at 498-502 (explaining why neutrality is an ideal that cannot be achieved).
266. See id. at 502 (stating that "[e]ven though each construction [of neutrality] relies on a
baseline that is not provably neutral, each has a value because people take solace in the notion
of neutrality").
267. See id. at 493 ("There is no independent neutral truth or baseline to which [claims of
neutrality] can be tethered.").
268. Id. at 501.
269. See id. at 516 (stating that "neutrality is especially dangerous because the Court would
simply be placing the label of neutrality on analysis that is neither neutral nor likely to lead to
'neutral' results and using the label to validate its approach").
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buzzword and a dangerous one at that, because it implies that the
supposedly neutral approach should be taken more seriously because it is
actually neutral.270
One problem with the neutrality principle as conceived by Laycock is that
his method for assuring a "neutral" result will not necessarily lead to such a
result in all cases. Laycock argues for "substantive neutrality," which requires
the government to "minimize the extent to which it either encourages or
discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or
nonobservance., 27' As Ravitch points out, however, extending funding to
religious schools may actually favor religious schools, depending on the
* 272situation. It is possible that the inclusion of religious schools in a
government aid program may skew parents' incentives toward sending their
children to a religious school. This could result from a high volume of
religious schools or a perception that religious schools offer certain advantages,
such as strict disciplinary control.27 3 Such a program could encourage religious
practice or observance. Thus, the neutrality approach may not be as effective a
standard as its proponents believe.
There may be deeper problems with the neutrality standard, in that it may
not distinguish school funding programs that violate the Free Exercise Clause
as the current Court understands it.274  Smith appeared to stand for the
proposition that a law may prohibit a religious activity as long as the purpose of
the law is not to specifically target religion.2 75 Lukumi adhered to Smith's focus
on the purpose of a law and also condemned laws that target religious beliefs.276
270. Id. at 517.
271. Laycock, supra note 16, at 160.
272. See supra note 264-70 and accompanying text (discussing Ravitch's criticism that a
so-called neutral approach will not always lead to a "neutral" result).
273. See Berg, supra note 9, at 157 (stating that families may choose religious schools
because of the school's "disciplinary policies").
274. At least two pre-Locke student notes suggest that the Free Exercise Clause's primary
concern is not neutrality, but rather laws that force people to act against their religious beliefs.
See Axtell, supra note 121, at 612 (stating that "[t]he neutrality required in the free exercise
analysis is that the object of the law is not to prohibit, hinder, or burden religious practices or
belief; whether the law is viewpoint neutral is not within the analytical framework of the Free
Exercise Clause"); Smith, supra note 79, at 1983 (arguing that neutrality is not "the paramount
constitutional value protected by the Free Exercise Clause").
275. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)
(stating that a general tax is valid "if prohibiting the exercise of religion.., is not the object of
the tax but merely the incidental effect").
276. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) ("Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of
a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation ... it is
invalid.... .") (citations omitted).
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Together these cases focused on laws that regulate religious beliefs or have a
purpose to suppress religion. 77
It is not clear that the incidental harm to religious beliefs that might result
from the exclusion of religious schools from voucher programs is the type of
harm to religious beliefs that the Free Exercise Clause was intended to
prevent.278 The Court has emphasized that an incidental burden on religion
may be acceptable.279 In a government funding case, the government is not
preventing citizens from holding any religious beliefs. Potential recipients are
free to forgo government benefits and pursue their religious beliefs. In fact, the
Court has previously recognized that "government regulation that indirectly...
calls for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to
religious beliefs is wholly different from governmental action.., that
criminalizes religiously inspired activity... .
28o
Furthermore, the Court has drawn a clear distinction between religious
belief and religious practice. 28 1 A voucher program that excludes religious
schools arguably inhibits religious practice rather than religious belief because
the "penalty" is for conduct, not for holding a particular belief. If the program
does not regulate religious beliefs, the only Free Exercise concern that a
voucher program would seem to implicate is the prohibition on government
actions that are taken with intent to suppress religious practice.
282
Lukumi indicated that the neutrality principle serves as a proxy for
nondiscriminatory purposes. According to the Lukumi Court, "[t]here are...
many ways of demonstrating '283 an intent to suppress religion, and "[t]o
determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text, for the minimum
requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate 
on its face. ',284
277. See Duncan, supra note 94, at 856 (stating that "[t]he Smith opinion was based in part
on the discredited distinction between religious belief and conduct").
278 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (describing a claim that it is
unconstitutional for the government to require a person to have a Social Security Number to
receive government benefits as "far removed from the historical instances of religious
persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause").
279. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535 ("[A]dverse impact
will not always lead to a finding of impermissible targeting.").
280. Bowen, 476 U.S., at 706.
281. See Duncan, supra note 94, at 856 (stating that, under Lukumi, "the right of religious
belief and profession does not include the right to engage in religiously motivated conduct")
(citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)).
282. See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text (discussing the types of laws the Free
Exercise Clause has been interpreted to prohibit).
283. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,533 (1993).
284. Id.
1307
62 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1271 (2005)
However, Locke did not rest its decision on the principle that Lukumi requires a
showing of motive as well as neutrality. 285 Instead, the Court found that the
reasoning behind Lukumi's conclusion was inapplicable.286
Lukumi involved a criminal law. 287 Requiring facial neutrality for criminal
laws might serve two purposes. A criminal prohibition that singles out
religious activity for the imposition of a criminal penalty is unlikely to be
necessary to achieve any substantial interest.288 Additionally, it is reasonable to
infer intent to discriminate from a law that singles out a particular religion for
punishment.289 Neutrality does not serve the same role in ihe school voucher
context. States may have legitimate reasons for excluding religious schools
from voucher programs, reasons unrelated to any discriminatory intent.29 °
Additionally, Establishment Clause-related interests often cannot be pursued in
a way that does not single out religious activities. 29 1 Arguably, the Free
Exercise Clause's main concern is that the government act without an intent to
suppress religion or target religious beliefs.292 The Free Exercise Clause does
not require equal funding for both secular and sectarian schools. Therefore,
neutrality, as conceived by Professor Laycock 3 is not the appropriate standard
for determining the constitutionality-under the Free Exercise Clause-of a
school aid program. Therefore, the condition an exclusionary voucher program
places on religious exercise is not by itself unconstitutional.
285. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (rejecting presumption of
unconstitutionality).
286. See id. (finding that applying the Lukumi presumption would extend that idea beyond
the reasoning of Lukumi).
287. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 528 (noting that the
ordinance violations were punishable by fines and imprisonment).
288. See id. at 546-47 (stating that "[w]here government restricts only conduct protected
by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing
substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the
restriction is not compelling").
289. See id. at 538 (stating that it is reasonable to find "that a law which visits 'gratuitous
restrictions' on religious conduct seeks ... to suppress the conduct because of its religious
motivation") (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520 (1961)) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
290. See. supra note 236 (considering legitimate interests a state may have in excluding
religious schools from voucher programs).
291. For example, a state may have an interest in not funding degrees in devotional
theology.
292. See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text (considering the protections the Free
Exercise Clause provides, as interpreted by the various Supreme Court cases).
293. See supra notes 246-62 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Laycock's
argument for substantive neutrality towards religion).
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An appropriate justification for upholding the burden placed on religion
by exclusionary voucher programs is that nonneutrality does not indicate a Free
Exercise violation. Neutrality should not be required. Neutrality is a sensible
principle for deciding Free Exercise challenges to criminal laws, but it does not
make sense as a standard for deciding school funding cases. Without the
neutrality principle, Laycock's argument against analogizing funding cases to
abortion cases loses its force.29
The unconstitutional condition argument has been put forth by school
choice advocates as a way to challenge programs that exclude religious
schools.295 The Locke Court declined to use the neutrality analysis set forth in
Lukumi and found that the condition placed on scholarship recipients' free
exercise was constitutional, as long as the program did not suggest animus
towards religion.29 Thus, Locke apparently affirms the argument that neutrality
is not "the paramount constitutional value protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. ''297 This Note argues that the reasoning in Locke is equally applicable
to school voucher cases because the neutrality principle should not be extended
to these cases. Neutrality is inappropriate because states may be pursuing
legitimate interests when they exclude religious schools from voucher
programs. 298 If the focus of a Free Exercise inquiry is to determine a purpose to
suppress religion, these interests must be weighed in the determination.
Therefore, the only time that such a program should be held unconstitutional is
when a challenger can show that the program was created with intent to inhibit
religion.
D. Endorsing a Focus on Animus Towards Religion
The Court in Locke was right to focus on "animus towards religion" 299 in
the face of the state's legitimate interest in excluding devotional theology
294. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Laycock's
unconstitutional condition argument).
295. See Berg, supra note 9, at 172 ("Challengers argue that the exclusion of religious-
school choices from a voucher program is an unconstitutional condition. .... ").
296. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720,725 (2004) (declining to extend Lukumi and
stating that the minor burden on scholar recipients was constitutional because of the state's
interest and because nothing about the program suggested animus towards religion).
297. Smith, supra note 79, at 1983.
298. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing the states' legitimate interests
in excluding religious schools from voucher programs).
299. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004)
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degrees from the Promise Scholarship Program.3 °° In cases involving criminal
prohibitions, neutrality may be used as a proxy for a purpose to suppress
religious practice.30' In funding cases, however, lack of neutrality does not
indicate the type of burden on religion that the Free Exercise Clause was
intended to prevent.30 2 Furthermore, neutrality is a flawed standard that might
not lead to a neutral result in funding cases.
30 3
A state may be motivated either by its own establishment concems 3°4 or an
interest in promoting the benefits of secular education to exclude religious
schools from a voucher program. These interests are not evidence of animus
towards religion. The exclusion cannot be presumed to be discriminatory and
therefore unconstitutional. Lack of neutrality is insufficient to establish intent
to suppress religion. Instead, a challenger will have to point to actual evidence
of animus towards religion. This standard appears to strike an appropriate
balance between the state's legitimate interests and a religious practitioner's
right not to be discriminated against. The Court's focus on animus may make
challenges to state "Blaine amendments" the best option for school voucher
advocates challenging exclusionary voucher programs.30 5
A test that requires proof of animus towards religion would be used to
determine whether the purpose of a law was to suppress religious practice. An
animus towards religion might be demonstrated by evidence in a law's
legislative history.306 Lack of any rational or legitimate reason for distinctive
treatment of religious activities would also be indicative of animus towards
religion.30 7 Animus might be indicated by a law that is overinclusive, in that it
300. See id. (noting "the historic and substantial state interest at issue").
301. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's use of
neutrality in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
302. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text (arguing that in the funding context
nonneutrality does not suppress religious beliefs or indicate intent to target religious practice).
303. See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text (discussing why neutrality may not
lead to a "neutral" result).
304. For an Establishment Clause related concern to be legitimate should not mean that the
action taken by the state is compelled by the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause
was written with an eye towards denying the government "all power to tax, to support, or
otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual
or group." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
305. This Note does not address the validity of state amendments that are alleged to reflect
antireligious animus. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing "Blaine
amendments").
306. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,540-42
(1993) (investigating the legislative history of the ordinances at issue to determine their
objective).
307. See id. at 536 (noting that the ordinances' distinctive treatment of religion supported
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burdens religious practice to a degree that is not necessary to achieve the law's
308objectives. °8 An underinclusive law that does not prohibit equally harmful
nonreligious conduct might also indicate animus towards religion.
30 9
VI. State-Sponsored Public Schools
310
Since the 1920s, parents have had the option of sending their children to
private religious schools at their own expense while states offered free public
and therefore secular education.31' The logic of the neutrality argument could
lead to the conclusion that state-funded private education is nonneutral and
treats religious activity unfavorably. The Supreme Court has indicated that
there is no constitutional right to a free public education.31 So, arguably, a
state's decision to fund secular public education disfavors religious activity to
the same degree as a voucher program that excludes religious schools. The
government is essentially conditioning assistance on the condition that
recipients forego a religious education.
Yet the Court has never ruled that free public education creates an
unconstitutional condition.3 1 3 The implication is that state provision of public
education and public education alone does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
If this is the case, then the result in the school voucher context should be no
different. Funding secular private schools and not funding sectarian private
schools is no different than providing free secular public education and not free
sectarian public education.
the Court's finding that the ordinances were intended to suppress religion).
308. See id. at 542 (finding that the ordinances were intended to suppress religion, in part,
because the laws prohibited more religious conduct than the laws' allegedly legitimate ends
should have required).
309. See id. at 543-45 (discussing how the challenged ordinances were underinclusive for
the City of Hialeah's alleged purposes).
310. I would like to thank Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski for pointing me toward this
argument.
311. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding
unconstitutional a law that compelled parents to send their children to public schools on the
basis that it interfered with parents' liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
312. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1972)
("Education... is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
constitution... [n]or do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly protected.").
313. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,462 (1973) ("In Pierce, the Court affirmed
the right of private schools to exist and to operate; it said nothing of any supposed right of
private or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse, on an equal basis or
otherwise.").
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VII. Discriminatory Religious Schools 3 14
Another problem with opening voucher programs to religious, schools
relates to how the states should deal with schools that engage in religiously-
motivated discrimination. 3 5 Arguably, a state may not, in the provision of state
services that are not generally available, indirectly violate the mandate that
state-operated schools may not discriminate on the basis of race.3 16 This
proposition would seem to bar states from giving any form of aid to
discriminatory sectarian schools. In fact, some state voucher programs that are
currently in place prohibit aid to schools that do not comply with a policy of
nondiscrimination.31 7
If the states may not extend funding to schools whose religious tenets
support discrimination, the natural consequence will be that religion-inclusive
voucher programs will be limited to the inclusion of more conventional
religious institutions. The result would be nonneutral disfavor of religious
groups that are not socially-accepted. Such nonneutral treatment is arguably
more invidious than a state's decision to withhold all religious funding. This
point merely adds to the argument for leaving funding decisions to the states.
The voucher context is one in which it seems that someone will be left feeling
slighted. Rather than leaving the Supreme Court to read the Constitution
against one group or the other, the issue is best left to the states.
VII Conclusion
Locke placed boundaries on the facial neutrality principle developed in
Lukumi. Rather than deciding the case based on the facial neutrality of the
program involved, the Court considered the state's substantial interest in not
314. I would like to thank Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski for pointing me toward this
argument.
315. See Berg, supra note 9, at 208-20 (discussing conditions that states might try to
impose on religious school eligibility). Professor Berg argues that some of these conditions may
work a "penalty" on religious choice. Id. at 211-12.
316. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 464-65 (noting that by giving tangible aid in any form to a
discriminatory religious school Mississippi was aiding the operation of that organization and
finding that such funding was prohibited by the principle that the state may not indirectly
engage in racial discrimination).
317. See, e.g., Onlo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(4) (Anderson 2005) (stating that no
private school may receive aid unless it "does not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or
ethnic background"); id. § 3313.976(A)(6) (stating that no private school may receive aid unless
it "does not advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion").
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funding devotional theological studies and the absence of animus toward
religion.318 Though it is not entirely clear whether a state would have a
substantial interest in excluding religious schools from voucher programs,
319
Locke may indicate the Court's intention to allow states to decide whether to
fund religious activities.320 A school voucher program can enjoy this deference
if a state can argue that Lukumi's presumption of unconstitutionality should
321Ilikewise not be extended to such programs.
This Note argues that Locke's reasoning extends to the school voucher
322context. It demonstrates that the neutrality principle is unworkable because it
does not serve the same purpose in the school voucher context that it served in
Lukumi.323 In light of this and the states' interests in not funding religious
education, funding distinctions based on religious activities do not necessarily
create a burden cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, such
distinctions cannot be said to create an unconstitutional condition.
The major issue remaining after Locke is how the Court will interpret the
substantial interest requirement and whether states can show a substantial
interest in excluding religious schools from voucher programs.324 The position
the Court ultimately takes may well be dictated by federalism concerns and a
desire to leave funding decisions to the states. Clearly, there is some tension
between the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause concerns. In an area where the burden on religion created by the denial
of vouchers for those who would use them at religious schools is minor (in the
sense that religious practice is not restricted in any way,) it may be wise to leave
funding decisions to the states' discretion. The Establishment Clause
developed because of a belief that no money should be paid from the
government to religious institutions325 and the states should have some leeway
318. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Locke opinion).
319. See supra Part III.B (discussing how the Court might address a school voucher
challenge after Locke).
320. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,721 (2004) (recognizing the legitimate reasons for
a state to act differently toward religious education as compared with other types of education).
321. See supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text (stating that school voucher cases
should be decided like Locke if Lukumi's presumption is not extended into that area).
322. See supra Part V (arguing that Locke should be extended to school voucher cases).
323. See supra Part V.C (arguing that the neutrality principle does not apply in the school
voucher context).
324. See supra Part III.B (discussing the application of the substantial interest requirement
in the school voucher context).
325. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (quoting James Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, at 65-66 (1947)).
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to enforce this philosophy as they see fit. States should not have to abandon
their own antiestablishment interests merely because the Supreme Court has
gradually weakened the Federal Constitution's Establishment Clause.
